Keyboard Shortcuts?

  • Next step
  • Previous step
  • Skip this slide
  • Previous slide
  • mShow slide thumbnails
  • nShow notes
  • hShow handout latex source
  • NShow talk notes latex source

Click here and press the right key for the next slide (or swipe left)

also ...

Press the left key to go backwards (or swipe right)

Press n to toggle whether notes are shown (or add '?notes' to the url before the #)

Press m or double tap to slide thumbnails (menu)

Press ? at any time to show the keyboard shortcuts


Searle vs Bratman on Cooperation

‘One can have a goal in the knowledge that others also have the same goal,
and one can have beliefs and even mutual beliefs about the goal that is shared by the members of a group,
without there being necessarily any cooperation among the members or any intention to cooperate’


Searle, 1990 p. 95

What is shared intention?

Functional characterisation:

shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities,
(b) coordinate planning, and
(c) structure bargaining


Inferential integration... and normative integration (e.g. agglomeration)

Substantial account:

We have a shared intention that we J if

‘1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

‘2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of la, lb, and meshing subplans of la and lb; you intend [likewise] …

‘3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us’

(Bratman 1993: View 4)

1. ‘The notion of a we-intention [shared intention]
... implies the notion of cooperation’


Searle (1990, p. 95)

[explain ‘we-intention’]
Why is this relevant. Because ...

2. Meeting Bratman’s proposed sufficient conditions for shared intention does not imply that youractions will be cooperative.

Bratman says this explicitly.


3. Bratman’s conditions are not in fact sufficient.

There are just two problems with this argument
First problem: how do we know this is true?
Second problem: what is it for our actions to be cooperative? (Bratman asserts the second premise, but does not provide justification ‘This involves a bit of linguistic leg­islation’.)

‘This involves a bit of linguistic leg­islation’


Bratman, 2015 p. 38

So Bratman thinks that the issue about cooperation is merely one on which we can do ‘linguistic leg­islation’.
Perhaps closer attention to the notion of cooperation would be rewarding ...
BratmanSimple View Revised
Is coercion compatible with joint action?yesyes
Does participating in joint action entail being aware that you are doing so?yes[ish]

Are all joint actions cooperative actions?

Are contralateral commitments necessary for joint action?nono