‘One can have a goal in the knowledge that others also have the same goal,
and one can have beliefs and even mutual beliefs about the goal that is shared by the members of a group,
without there being necessarily any cooperation among the members or any intention to cooperate’
\citep[p.~95]{Searle:1990em}
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What is shared intention?
Functional characterisation:
shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities,
(b) coordinate planning, and
(c) structure bargaining
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1. ‘The notion of a we-intention [shared intention]
... implies the notion of cooperation’
\citep[p.~95]{Searle:1990em}
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[explain ‘we-intention’]
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Why is this relevant. Because ...
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2. Meeting Bratman’s proposed sufficient conditions for shared intention does not imply that youractions will be cooperative.
Bratman says this explicitly.
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Therefore:
3. Bratman’s conditions are not in fact sufficient.
There are just two problems with this argument
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First problem: how do we know this is true?
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Second problem: what is it for our actions to be cooperative?
(Bratman asserts the second premise, but does not provide justification
‘This involves a bit of linguistic legislation’.)
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‘This involves a bit of linguistic legislation’
\citep[p.~38]{bratman:2014_book}
So Bratman thinks that the issue about cooperation is merely one on which
we can do ‘linguistic legislation’.
Perhaps closer attention to the notion of cooperation would be rewarding ...