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Humans from around two years of age or earlier can readily attribute states to an imaginary agent, identify how it needs to act given those states and perform actions on its behalf. Note that in acting on behalf of imaginary agents they may be furthering their own real-world objectives (as in `Teddy wants to go to the park.').

Joint action sometimes involves imaginary agents as well---not teddies, of course, but imaginary composite agents.

Lucina and Charlie each want to complete a multi-step task. Lucina imagines that she and Charlie are an aggregate subject, Lucina-and-Charlie, and attributes to this imaginary agent the intention of completing the task. Charlie does the same, ascribing the same intention to the imaginary agent.

Do such imaginary activities presuppose shared intentions? Certainly we require something to make it the case that it is not merely an accident that Charlie imagines the same agent and attributes the same intention as Lucina. %\footnote{The case described here is not one of joint acton \emph{with} an imaginary agent. The actual agents, Lucina and Charlie, are real. But what makes their action interestingly joint is the fact that they each construe themselves as acting on behalf of an imaginary composite agent, Lucina-and-Charlie.}

This is a joint action in that Lucina and Charlie work together to achieve an outcome which occurs as a common effect of their actions.

Incidentally, this case indicates that some of the functions assigned to shared intention can be also fulfilled by imaginings. Charlie and Lucina construe their actions as if they were the actions of a single agent, and it is this imaginary exercise which makes them responsive to each others' actions and causes them to coordinate their activities by executing complementary parts of what must be done on behalf of the imaginary agent.

What does this get us? An imaginary aggregate subject. But is there more?