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among all their actual and possible consequences,

there are outcomes to which they are directed

and the actions are collectively directed to this outcome

so it is not just a matter of each individual action being directed to this outcome.

In such cases we can say that the actions are clearly purposive.

Concerning any such actions, we can ask What is the relation between a purposive action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is directed?

The standard answer to this question involves intention.

An intention (1) specifies an outcome,

(2) coordinates the one or several activities which comprise the action;

and (3) coordinate these activities in a way that would normally facilitate the outcome’s occurrence.

What binds particular component actions together into larger purposive actions? It is the fact that these actions are all parts of plans involving a single intention. What singles out an actual or possible outcome as one to which the component actions are collectively directed? It is the fact that this outcome is represented by the intention.

So the intention is what binds component actions together into purposive actions and links the action taken as a whole to the outcomes to which they are directed.

But is intention the only thing that can link actions to outcomes? I will suggest that motor representations can likewise perform this role.

Here are two sentences, both true:

The first sentence is naturally read *distributively*; that is, as specifying something that each drop did individually. Perhaps first drop one fell, then another fell.

But the second sentence is naturally read *collectively*. No one drop soaked Zach’s trousers; rather the soaking was something that the drops accomplised together.

If the sentence is true on this reading, the tiny drops' soaking Zach’s trousers is not a matter of each drop soaking Zach’s trousers.

Now consider an example involving actions and their outcomes:

This sentence can be read in two ways, distributively or collectively. We can imagine that we are talking about a sequence of actions done over a period of time, each of which soaked Zach’s trousers. In this case the outcome, soaking Zach’s trousers, is an outcome of each action.

Alternatively we can imagine several actions which have this outcome collectively---as in our illustration where Ayesha holds a glass while Beatrice pours. In this case the outcome, soaking Zach’s trousers, is not necessarily an outcome of any of the individual actions but it is an outcome of all of them taken together. That is, it is a collective outcome.

(Here I'm ignoring complications associated with the possibility that some of the actions collectively soaked Zach’s trousers while others did so distributively.)

Note that there is a genuine ambiguity here. To see this, ask yourself how many times Zach’s trousers were soaked. On the distributive reading they were soaked at least as many times as there are actions. On the collective reading they were not necessarily soaked more than once. (On the distributive reading there are several outcomes of the same type and each action has a different token outcome of this type; on the collective reading there is a single token outcome which is the outcome of two or more actions.)

Conclusion so far: two or more actions involving multiple agents can have outcomes distributively or collectively. This is not just a matter of words; there is a difference in the relation between the actions and the outcome.

Now consider one last sentence:

Like the previous sentence, this sentence has both distributive and collective readings. On the distributive reading, each of their actions was directed to an outcome, namely soaking Zach’s trousers. So there were as many attempts on his trousers as there are actions. On the collective reading, by contrast, it is not necessary that any of the actions considered individually was directed to this outcome; rather the actions were collectively directed to this outcome.

Conclusion so far: two or more actions involving multiple agents can be collectively directed to an outcome.

For example, when two agents between them lift a heavy block by means of each agent pulling on either end of a rope connected to the block via a system of pulleys, their pullings count as coordinated just because the rope relates the force each exerts on the block to the force exerted by the other.

In this case, the agents' activities are coordinated by a mechanism in their environment, the rope, and not necessarily by any psychological mechanism.

To make a conjecture based on work with bees and ants, in some cases ...

the coordination needed for a collective goal may even be supplied by behavioural patterns \citep{seeley2010honeybee} and pheromonal signals \citep[pp.\ 178-83, 206-21]{hoelldobler2009superorganism}.

So the definition seems inadequate. Either it includes things that are not joint actions at all, or else it captures a notion of joint action that is broader than the core cases of shared agency that have been of primary interest to philosophers.

And, to return to the point about cooperation, the bare idea that our actions have a collective goal implies nothing about cooperation.

This is not to say that collective goals never involve psychological states.

In fact, one way for several actions to have a collective goal is for their agents to be acting on a shared intention;

a shared intention supplies the required coordination.

We’ve been considering the idea that we can extend our defintion of joint to include the notion of a collective goal ... On our current working definition, a joint action is an event with two or more agents where the actions have a collective goal.

The definition is still too broad. To make progress we need to think not just about collective goals but about the different kinds of thing in virtue of which some actions can have a collective goal ...